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Davis: Compensatory and Punitive Damages for Age Discrimination in Emplo

COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
INTRODUGrION

The opportunity to utilize one's abilities in gainful employment has long
been recognized by American courts as a desirable goal. As expressed by
Supreme Court Justice Bradley in 1884: "The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right; it was formulated as such under
the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence .... ."I
2
Although Bradley's attitude has often been adopted by the Supreme Court,
courts generally have failed to provide older workers with protection against
job discrimination.2 Until Congress enacted the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 19674 (ADEA, or Act), older workers throughout the
country5 were unprotected. 6 The ADEA was enacted for three reasons: to proI.

Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J., con-

curring).
2. In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) the Supreme Court said: "It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community
is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
[14th] amendment to secure." Id. at 41, cited in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
102-03 & n.23 (1976). See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 473 n.1 (1954) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (the right to work is the most precious liberty man possesses).
3. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 99 S.Ct. 939 (1979) (forced retirement of foreign service
officer at age 60 does not violate equal protection); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (forced retirement of state highway patrolman at age fifty does
not violate equal protection). See also Serwer, Mandatory Retirement at Age 65-A Survey of
The Law, I INDus. GRONTOLOGY 11, 22 (1974), where it is observed that "almost certainly
unsuccessful have been those employees who have claimed their employer's retirement policy
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." See generally Note, Age
Discriminationin Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 924, (1975); Note, The ConstitutionalChallenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 748 (1975); Note, Too Old to
Work: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Retirement Plans, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 150 (1971);
Comment, Constitutional Attacks on Mandatory Retirement: A Reconsideration, 23 U.C.LA.
L. Rav. 549 (1976); Comment, Mandatory Retirement: The Law, The Courts, and the Broader
Social Context, 11 NVruAmE L.J. 398 (1975).
4. 29 U.S.C. § §621-634 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
5. C. EDELMAN 8& I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 59-67
(1978). Prior to passage of the ADEA employment discrimination based on age was prohibited
by a number of states, but not all. These statutes fell into three categories: (1) fair employment
practices laws prohibiting employment discrimination on a broad range of grounds such as
race, religion, national origin, sex and age; (2) statutes dealing only with age discrimiination
in employment; (3) human rights laws prohibiting discrimination in, for example, housing,
public accommodations, and employment. Colorado passed the first age discrimination law in
1903. About three-quarters of the states today have some such law. They vary widely in the
protection given, the breadth of coverage, and the means of obtaining redress for violations.
Only moderate success has been obtained in fighting age discrimination in employment at
the state level. Id.
6. A limited federal step toward dealing with age discrimination in employment had
been taken by President Johnson in 1964. By Executive Order No. 11,141 the President de-
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mote employment of older persons based on ability rather than age, to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment, and to help employers and workers find solutions to problems arising from the effect of age on employment.7
Congress expected to eliminate age discrimination by educating the public
about the aging process, thus dispelling misconceptions8 which lead to age
discrimination. 9 Therefore, enforcing the act would be less important than
educating the public. 1° To inform the public about the aging process, the
ADEA required the Secretary of Labor to undertake a continuing program to
2
provide information" to labor unions, management, and the general public.
From the inception of the ADEA, the Secretary of Labor's educational program has been a vital ingredient in administering and obtaining compliance
elared the policy of the executive branch of the federal government that: (1) contractors and
subcontractors of federal projects not discriminate against persons because of their age; and,
(2) that these contractors and subcontractors not specify maximum ages for employment in
their advertising unless it was based on a bona fide occupational qualification, retirement
plan, or statute. Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1974). The executive order had no
means of enforcement; its purpose was only to bring the policy to the attention of those doing
business with the government, and to request their compliance.

7. 29 U.S.C. §621(b) (1976).
8. A recent study revealed that the general public considers the older worker to be less
productive, more accident prone, and less flexible in dealing with other people than his
younger counterpart. Rosen & Jerdee, The Nature of Job Related Stereotypes, 61 J. APPL.
PsYcn. 180, 181-82 (1976). Productivity has been shown to decline for workers over 65, but the
decline is very gradual. M. RILEY & A. FONER, ACING AND SOCIETY 426 (1968). Accident proneness is unrelated to age. Kunce, Vocational Interests and Accident Proneness,51 J. APPL. PSYCH.

223 (1967).
9.

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AGING,

93D. CONG., IST SESS., IMPROVING THE AGE DISCRIMINA-

LAW iii (Comm. Print 1973). The Senate Special Committee on Aging expressed this
general opinion, saying, "[the] ADEA was enacted not only to enforce the law, but to provide
facts that would help change attitudes." Id.
10. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADM. NEws 2213, 2216. The House of Representatives reported: "These functions [education
and information] can do much to correct age discriminatory employment practices and are
therefore vital to the overall effectiveness of the bill. They are means of affecting [sic] . . . the
simple justice the proposal espouses, thereby making enforcement measures unnecessary." Id.
11. 29 U.S.C. §622(a) (1976).
TION

12.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, AGE DISCRIMINA-

TION IN EMPLOYMENT Acr OF 1967, 14-15 (1979). The program includes channeling information
to the newspapers, supplying ADEA posters for display in places of employment, speeches by
employees of the Employment Standards Administration, slide and film shows, and public
service radio and television announcements. Two publications are also provided. One is the
Fact Sheet which summarizes the provisions of the ADEA. The other is the Employment
Standards Digest which reports on judicial, legislative, and administrative developments
affecting the ADEA.
The educational program of the Secretary of Labor may not conform to the congressional
instructions. An examination of the contents of the program reveals that much more emphasis
is placed on informing the public, labor unions, and management of the black letter provisions
of the ADEA than is placed on furnishing information about the needs and abilities of older
workers. Repetitive lectures on the requirements of the law without equal emphasis on dispelling the stereotypes which underlie discrimination may foster resentment of the statute.
Publicizing the irrationality of age discrimination in employment is more likely to foster the
voluntary compliance which Congress intended.
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with the Act.1S There is evidence, however, that the program has failed to reduce age discrimination in employment. 14 There have been suggestions that
awarding compensatory and punitive damages to successful plaintiffs would
encourage compliance with the Act. 15 This note will explore the availability of
compensatory and punitive damages and the capacity of those remedies to
prevent age discrimination in employment.
Analysis of the remedies issue will be preceded by an overview of the ADEA
regarding both prohibited and permitted practices. The methods and elements
of proof in a plaintiff's discrimination case will then be discussed. The principal question of the availability of compensatory and punitive damages will
be analyzed in terms of the present federal case law and a solution to the problem will be suggested.
PROHIBITED EMPLOYMENT PRACrICES

The ADEA prohibits age discrimination by employees, 16 unions7 or ememployment agencies 8 against employeesle or applicants 20 between2l the ages
13. See note 10 supra. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS AnMINISTRATION, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, 14 (1979): "Such a program
is a vital ingredient in administering this law and obtaining compliance with it."

14. See note 221 and accompanying text, infra.
15. Hassan v. Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, Inc., Civ. No. 79-206 slip op. (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 1979). The court suggested two ways in which the award of compensatory damages
could increase compliance with the Act. First, the prospect of damage awards would act as an
incentive for employers to comply. Second, employees would have incentive to vindicate their
rights in the event of non-compliance. Id.
16. 29 U.S.C. §630(b) (1976). An "employer" is a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, any agent of such a person, a state,
or political subdivision of a state, and any interstate agency but not the United States or a
wholly-owned corporation of the United States. The reference to commerce provides a predicate for federal action. Id. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power "[t]o regulate commerce ... among the several states .
U.S. CONsr.
art 1, §8.
17. 29 U.S.C. §630(d) (1976). "Labor organization" is defined as a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce in which employees participate which exists for the
purpose of dealing with employers with respect to grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay,
hours, wages, or other terms or conditions of employment, or any agent of such an organization, or any conference, general committee, joint or system board or joint council so engaged
which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization. Id.
18. 29 U.S.C. §630(c) (1976). An "employment agency" is any person regularly undertaking to procure employees for an employer, with or without compensation, including an
agent of such person, but excluding any agency of the United States. Id.
19. 29 U.S.C. §630(f) (1976). "Employees" are those employed by an included employer.
See note 16 infra. The term excludes elected officials of states and their political subdivisions,
the personal staff of such officials, appointed policy-makers or immediate advisors who are not
subject to the civil service laws of a state government, agency or political subdivision. Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. §623 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
21. Thus, it is unlawful in situations where this Act applies, for an employer to dis-

criminate by giving preference because of age to an individual 30 years old over another
individual who is within the protected age range. Similarly, an employer violates the Act
when one individual within the protected age range is given job preference in hiring, assign-
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of forty22 and seventy 2 concerning compensation, conditions 24 or privileges of

employment. Furthermore it is unlawful for an employer to classify protected
employees so as to deprive them of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect their status because of age.2 5 Reducing a younger employee's
wages to match those of an older employee is also prohibited.26
The practices prohibited by the ADEA are similar to those prohibited by
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.27 Title VII proscribes discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.28 Although
ment, promotion, or any other term, condition, or privilege of employment, on the basis of
age, over another individual within the same age range. The Act, however, does not restrain
age discrimination between two individuals 25 and 35 years of age. 29 C.F.R. §860.91 (1979).
Presumably, it would be lawful for an employer to favor an employee between 40 and 65
over an employee under 40. Likewise, since those over 70 are unprotected, favoring an employee over 70, over an employee between 40 and 70, would be unlawful. This latter result is
an anomaly, however, when viewed against the general purposes of the Act, "to promote
29 U.S.C. §621(4)(b)
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age .

(1976).
22. H.R. REx,. No. 805, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2213, 2219. The House Committee on Education and Labor set the lower age
limit at 45 in the original bill, but altered the limit to 40 before passage. Testimony indicated
that 40 was the age at which age discrimination becomes evident, and 40 was the lower limit
in most state statutes on the subject. Representatives of airline stewardesses, many of whom
are not permitted to work as stewardesses after age 52, argued strongly for a lower limit. The
Committee recognized the gross and arbitrary discrimination which this represented, but
declined to further lower the limit because expanding protection further would lessen the
primary objective, the promotion of employment opportunities for older workers. In response to the stewardesses' plea, the Commission added subsection 3(b) to 29 U.S.C. §626 (1966),
calling for the Secretary of Labor to undertake study in this area, and to report to Congress
his recommendations for changing the age limits.
23. 29 U.S.C. §631(a) (Supp. II 1978). As originally passed the upper age limit of the
ADEA was 65. No discussion was given to the question of the proper age for the upper limit.
Presumably 65 was selected because that was the age at which male workers became eligible
for social security. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977), reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 504, 531. The Social Security Act selected the age of 65 arbitrarily, in part because of the tradition of use of this age in the social security system of pre-war
Germany. Id. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 raised the
upper age limit to 70, with minor exceptions. Age Discrimination and Employment Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 95-256, 92 Stat. 190 (amending 29 U.S.C. §631(a) (1976)).
24. Some exceptions have been allowed for "terms" and "conditions." For example, bus
drivers are required to take periodic physical examinations to assure that they meet certain
minimum physical standards. The Wage-Hour Administrator has issued the opinion that
requiring older drivers to take more frequent examinations is not unreasonable if the minimum standards are uniformly applied to drivers of all ages. Opinion Letter of Wage-Hour
Administrator (WH-137) (June 24, 1971), [1977] 2 EMPLOY. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) §5028. It is
also permitted that fringe benefits, such as vacations or sick leave, be based on length of
service if age plays no part in the establishment of those benefits. Opinion Letter of the
Wage-Hour Administration (September 10, 1978), [1978] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 401:5216.
25. 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(2) (1976).
26. 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(3) (1976). If an employer has violated the ADEA by paying a
younger worker more than an employee within the protected age bracket, the employer must
raise the wage of the protected worker rather than lower the wage of the younger worker. 29
C.F.R. §860.75 (1979).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to 2222e-17 (1976).
28. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1976).
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Congress could have simply amended Title VII to include age as a protected
classification, 29 a separate enactment was chosen. One reason for this choice
was administrative. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
which administered Title VII, was already overburdened. 30 Therefore, administration of the ADEA was shifted tothe Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.31 It is still unsettled whether Congress implied different
degrees of protection under Title VII and the ADEA by providing separate
32
administration of the Acts.
LAwFUL PRACrCES

In addition to sharing nearly identical language prohibiting discriminatory
practices,3 3 the ADEA and Title VII are similar in another respect: both acts
recognize that not all differential treatment of employees is discriminatory.
Accordingly, both acts permit exceptions, or defenses, to the statutorily prohibited practices.
The Bona Fide OccupationalQualification(BFOQ)Defense
Otherwise prohibited discrimination is permitted if "age is a bona fide

occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of the business." 3' 4 This exception is also permitted under Title VII.35 The parallel lan29. Several members of Congress felt that the ADEA should simply be an extension of
Title VII. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination
Bills Before The Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 35 (1967); (statement by Sen. Murphy); Id. at 29 (statement of Sen.
Smathers). In 1974, despite the existence of the ADEA, two bills were introduced to amend
Title VII to include age as a protected classification: H.R. 16972, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
120 CONG. REc. H10598 (Daily Ed. Oct. 15, 1974). Both bills died in the House Education and
Labor Committee.
30. See 113 CoNG. RFc. (1967). The EEOC was beyond its capacity in dealing with race
and sex discrimination cases. To add to the burden would only lengthen the delays which
were plaguing the agency. Delays in the case of the aged discriminatee were particularly
undesirable. Id. (remarks of Sen. Javits, Senate sponsor of the ADEA).
31. See 113 CONG. R c. 7076 (1967). Sen. Javits offered the amendment to the ADEA to
assign administration of the Act to the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.
Senator Javits explained that the Wage and Hour Office was an existing, nationwide structure
into which administration of the ADEA could be integrated. This would eliminate duplication
of agencies and avoid the delays which plagued the EEOC. Id.
32. Compare Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 585 F.2d 967. 969 (10th Cir. 1978) (rules
controlling a racial discrimination case apply to case of age discrimination) with Vasquez v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1354-55 (D.P.R. 1975) ("[Congress] specifically rejected the proposed administrative agency and enforcement procedure, which were analogous
to EEOC and Title VI .... Viewed in this legislative context, as well as the different structure of the two statutes, it is readily apparent that Title VII enforcement procedures cannot
be fairly equated with those of the ADEA."), rev'd, 579 F.2d 107 (Ist. Cir. 1978).
33. See note 29 supra.
34. 29 U.S.C. §623(f) (1) (1976).
85. The only difference between the language of the BFOQ exception under Title VII
and under the ADEA is that "religion, sex or national origin" in Title VII are replaced with
.,age" in the ADEA. Race, a characteristic which may not be the basis for discrimination
under Title VII, is not permitted as a BFOQ exception. Compare 29 U.S.C. §623(f) (1) (1976)
with 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e) (1976).
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guage of these laws suggests that Congress intended the courts to interpret the
statutes similarly.36 The Secretary of Labor, whom Congress charged with interpretation and enforcement of the ADEA 3 7 construes the BFOQ defense
under the ADEA according to current interpretation of parallel Title VII
provisions.3 Thus, judicial analysis of the BFOQ defense should be the same
under Title VII and the ADEA. Although the courts have espoused this principle, 39 they have not always followed

it.40

The BFOQ Defense Under Title VII
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has recommended that courts narrowly construe the BFOQ defense. 41 Stereotypes and
general class-based assumptions of comparative abilities and qualifications cannot serve as a basis for a BFOQ defense.42 Destroying such generalities is a
necessary step toward eliminating class-based discrimination, the underlying
goal of anti-discrimination legislation. The use of stereotypes by employers in
defense of their actions tends to preserve the stereotype and perpetuate the
effects of past discrimination. 43 Therefore, pursuant to the EEOC's suggestion,
courts have generally applied a narrow construction to the BFOQ defense in
Title VII cases.
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 44 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that an employer unlawfully discriminated against a
female employee by refusing to allow her to bid for the position of switchman. 45 Southern Bell's BFOQ defense, that a switchman's job was "strenuous"
and required lifting of heavy equipment,46 was rejected because it was based
on the stereotyped characterization that women could not lift heavy weights.
The court noted that Southern Bell had introduced no evidence concerning
36. See Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270 n.11 (4th Cir. 1977). For the general intent
to follow a parallel analysis, see Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 733
(5th Cir. 1977).
37. Exec. Order No. 12,106, 44 Fed. Reg. 1053 (1979). Effective July 1, 1979, enforcement
of the ADEA was transferred from the Department of Labor to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This transfer should increase the similarity of interpretation
between the ADEA and Title VII, since the EEOC has enforced Title VII since its inception.
38. See 29 C.F.R. §860.102 (1979).
39. See Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270 (4th Cir. 1977); Houghton v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978).
40. See generally Player, Defenses Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Misinterpretation,Misdirection, and the 1978 Amendments, 12 GA. L. REV. 746, 751-67 (1978).
BFOQ defenses in Title VII cases may not be based on stereotypes of the aggrieved class.
However, this defense has been allowed, if based on general assumptions about the physical
effects of aging in ADEA cases. Id. at 766-67.
41. EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §1064.2 (1979).
42. 29 C.F.R. §1604.2(a)(1)(ii), (iii) (1979).
43. See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 380, 396-97 (1976).
44. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
45. Id. at 235.
46. Id. at 234. At trial it was established that switchmen must routinely lift equipment
weighing in excess of 30 pounds. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss4/4

6

Davis: Compensatory and Punitive Damages for Age Discrimination in Emplo
1980]

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

the lifting abilities of women.47 The court specifically disagreed with an earlier
Title VII case which held that generally recognized physical capabilities and
physical limitations of the sexes may be the basis for occupational qualifications.48 The Weeks court conceded that an employer may apply a reasonable

general rule when he demonstrates that it is impossible or impractical to deal
with applicants on an individual basis, but observed that no such showing had
been made in this case.49 The court concluded that to rely on a BFOQ an employer must prove he had a factual basis for believing that all or substantially
all women would be unable to perform the job safely and efficiently.50
The Weeks test was expanded by the Fifth Circuit in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc.51 There the employer airline refused to allow men to serve
as cabin attendants. Pan American defended this policy as a BFOQ on the
grounds that airline passengers perferred female attendants and that women
were better suited to serve the special psychological needs of airline passengers.52
In rejecting these arguments, the court turned to that portion of the Title VII
requiring that a BFOQ be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business. ..

."53

According to the court, necessity exists only if

hiring both sexes would undermine the essence of the employer's business.5 4
The court found the primary function of an airline was to transport passengers
safely from one point to another. While female attendants might make the
passenger section's environment more pleasant, that was not the essence of the
airline business.5 5 Therefore, sex discrimination as practiced by Pan American
in hiring only female attendants was not justified as a BFOQ.
Taken together, Weeks and Diaz form a stringent test for an employer
asserting a BFOQ defense to a Title VII action. Almost invariably, evidence
by the employer purporting to show that substantially all of the aggrieved class
could not meet the job requirements have been rejected as insufficient. 56 Judicial
construction of the BFOQ defense under the ADEA, however, has been less
protective of discriminatees than under Title VII, even though the same BFOQ
test supposedly applied to both statutes.
The BFOQ Defense Under the ADEA
The first appellate treatment of the BFOQ defense under the ADEA was in
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 57 a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case.

Hodgson involved a challenge to Greyhound's policy of refusing to hire intercity
Id.
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
408 F.2d 235 n.5.
Id. at 2M5.
442 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
Id. at 888.
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2e (1976).
54. 442 F.2d at 888.
55. Id.
56. E.g., Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 897 F. Supp. 436, 455 (W.D. N.C. 1975), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
57. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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bus driver applicants over age thirty-five. 58 Greyhound argued that its policy
was premised on considerations of public safety, 59 and therefore constituted a
BFOQ.6 Newly hired drivers were assigned to "extra-board" driving, 61 which
was more arduous and dangerous than regular assignments. When a driver ac62
cumulated sufficient seniority, he could acquire a less demanding regular run.
Thus, as the effects of age began to take hold, a driver would be in a position
to move to easier tasks. If its hiring age limits were not observed, Greyhound's
seniority system would prevent this beneficial progression of older drivers to
easier runs. Older drivers would be working on the most demanding routes
with a possible detrimental effect on safety.63 To support these arguments,
Greyhound introduced evidence of the demanding nature of extra-board work,
including statistical evidence of a higher accident rate with extra-board duty
and of the general physical and sensory decline which begins around age thirtyfive.6 4 The government admitted that these degenerative changes occur, but
countered that these effects were compensated in the older driver by increased
maturity and experience. 65 In addition, the government argued that any such
infirmities would be detected during the course of elaborate physical, psychological, and functional examinations conducted by Greyhound in screening
intercity driver applicants. 66 The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, citing
Weeks' "factual-basis" test, and finding Greyhound's evidence inadequate to
6
meet that test. y

In overturning the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
Weeks test for cases where consideration goes beyond the welfare of the job
58. Id. The suit was brought on behalf of only those applicants over the age of 40.
Applicants 35-39 years of age were unprotected by ADEA.
59. Id. at 865. Greyhound argued that a driver is maximally safe after 16 years of
interstate driving experience, and that this length of experience could not be acquired by
newly-employed older drivers before the age of 65. There was no explanation why this
would prevent the hiring of drivers with no experience who were less than 49 years old, since
such a driver could attain 16 years experience before the retirement age. Furthermore, there
was no explanation why bus driving experience with another company would not be considered, thus reducing the driving time necessary with Greyhound and elevating the maximum
hiring age.
60. Id. at 861.
61. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230, 235 (N.D. III. 1973), rev'd, 499
F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Greyhound divided drivers into
two general classifications: those who drive "regular" runs and those who drive "extra-board"
runs. Regular runs are scheduled service between two given points. All other assignments are
"extra-board." They are in response to passenger demand and consist of special operations,
towns, charters, and extra sections of regular runs if there is a need for more than one bus
on a regular run. Extra-board drivers do not have scheduled routes and work off the board
on a first-in, first-out basis. 354 F. Supp. at 235.
62. 499 F.2d at 864. Generally 10-40 years of extra-board driving were necessary before a
driver had enough seniority to acquire a regular run. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 863-65. There was no discussion of the fact that older drivers could drive the
extra-board if they so desired. Advanced age did not automatically prevent this election.
65. Id. at 863.
66. Id.
67. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d
859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
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applicant to a consideration of public safety.6s The court found the holding of
Diaz more appropriate, noting significant similarity between the "essence" of
the airline's business in Diaz, and the "essence" of Greyhound's business. Both
were concerned with the safe transportation of their passengers. Thus, Greyhound needed to establish only that the safety of its passengers would be
lessened if it were forced to hire drivers over forty. 69 The court then looked to
Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc.70 in which the Tenth Circuit had addressed

the validity of pre-employment job qualifications for airline flight officers. 1
There the court stated that the employer's burden to show that his employment
criteria are job-related becomes lighter when the job requires a high degree of
skill and the human and economic risks of hiring an unqualified applicant are
great.72 Noting that essentially the same risks were present in Greyhound, the
court found it unnecessary to show that all or substantially all bus driver applicants over forty could not perform safely. Greyhound needed to demonstrate
only a rational basis in fact for believing that changing its hiring policy would
minimally increase the danger to its passengers, by jeopardizing the life of even
one person. 73 Upon review of the evidence, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
Greyhound had made this minimal demonstration.
In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,74 a case with facts virtually identical
to Greyhound,75 the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's dropping
of the Weeks test, yet upheld the bus company's BFOQ defense by another
method. The court believed that Weeks and Diaz taken together formed a test
which was sufficiently flexible to take public safety into account. The court
reasoned that Diaz required that a job be analyzed to determine if the job
qualifications which the employer had invoked were reasonably necessary to
the essence of his business - in Tamiami, the safe transportation of passengers. 76
As the safety factor increases, measured by the likelihood and potential severity
of harm, the more stringent the job qualifications may be to insure safety. 7
68. 499 F.2d at 861.
69. Id. at 862.
70. 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
71. Id. at 217-19. Spurlock was a Title VII discrimination case in which the plaintiff
attacked United's minimum standards for hiring flight officers. Applicants were not considered
unless they had, inter alia, 500 hours of flight time, a commercial pilot's license and instrument rating, and a college degree. The college degree could be waived if the applicant's other
qualifications were superior. The plaintiff alleged these facially neutral requirements had
an adverse discriminatory effect on blacks. Id.
72. Id. at 219. This test was taken from the EEOC Guidelines. 29 C.F.R. 1607.5(e)(2)(lii)
(1979).
73. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d at 863.
74. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
75. Id. at 230-33. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., is the oldest bus company in Florida. It
serves Florida, Georgia and Alabama as a participant in the non-profit association known
commercially as "Trailways." Tamiami's hiring procedures required that an applicant be
less than 40 years old and pass a thorough physical examination. Thereafter, bus drivers were
examined annually and were continuously rated with respect to job performance, safety
record, attitude, and physical fitness. The use of the extra board and Tamiami's seniority
system were identical to Greyhound's. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text, supra.
76. 531 F.2d at 236.
77. Id. Thus, if there was low probability of an accident and the consequences of the
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The court concluded that Tamiami satisfied the Diaz prong of the test because
there had been no suggestion that the minimum hiring age was either unre78
lated to the essence of the business or unreasonable in light of the safety risk.
The second step of the test was taken from Weeks. The defendant must
show that either there was a factual basis for believing all, or substantially all,
persons over forty would be unable to perform the job safely, or that it was im79
practical to deal with the applicants over forty on an individualized basis.
Since Tamiami had not attempted to establish a factual basis for believing that
substantially all job applicants over forty would be unable to drive buses safely,
it was necessary that it demonstrate that unsafe characteristics of drivers over
80
forty could not be ascertained on an individual basis. After reviewing the
evidence, the court found no clear error in the district court's holding that
individual testing would be ineffective to meet the defendant's safety needs, and
upheld the discriminatory hiring policy.
In Arritt v. Grisells, the Fourth Circuit chose between the BFOQ tests of
Greyhound and Tamiami. The plaintiff in Arritt was an applicant for a police
officer's position in a city which refused to consider applicants over thirty-five.2
The district court had granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
83
relying on the Greyhound test. The Court of Appeals reversed on this point,
84

citing Tamiami as the proper standard for evaluating the BFOQ defense.

accident, measured in human and monetary terms, were not serious, the job qualifications
could not be stringent. Conversely, stringent qualifications were permitted if the probability
of an accident was high and severe injury or economic loss could result. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. It might be practical to deal with applicants individually if a test for functional
age, as opposed to chronological age, were developed. Some work has been done toward this
goal. See generally McFarland, The Need For Functional Age Measurements In Industrial
Gerontology, INDUS. GERONTOLOGY 1 (Fall 1973).
80. 531 F.2d at 236-37.
81. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). A primary issue in Arritt was whether the ADEA could
be enforced against local governments. The Supreme Court decision in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), held that the extension of the wage and overtime provisions of FLSA to local and state government employees engaged in traditional functions of
government could not be upheld as a constitutionally valid regulation of interstate commerce,
because the tenth amendment limits exercise of the powers of Congress under the commerce
clause. Id. at 855. The defendants in Arritt argued that this same rationale would prevent
application of the ADEA to local and state governments. The court rejected this argument,
finding the ADEA to be grounded on §5 of the fourteenth amendment rather than the commerce clause. 567 F.2d at 1270.
82. 567 F.2d at 1269.
83. Id. at 1271.
84. Id. The court stated that the proper standard was the two-pronged test formulated in
Usery, where the burden was on the employer to show: (1) that the BFOQ which it invoked
was reasonably necessary to the essence of the business (in Arritt the business was the operation of an efficient police department for the protection of the public), and (2) that the
employer had reasonable cause, i.e., a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons in the class (persons over 35) would be unable to perform the duties involved
efficiently and safely, or that it was impossible or impractical to deal with persons over that
age limit on an individual basis. Id. at 236.
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The case was remanded to give the plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the evidence offered by the defendants, with no opinion on whether the facts and
conclusions set out by the defendant were sufficient to sustain its burden under
Tamiami.85
Of the two BFOQ tests examined, Tamiami appearently offers the greater
protection to the plaintiff, since Greyhound lowers the evidentiary standard to
simply showing a rational basis for defendant's belief that older persons should
not be hired, while Tamiami requires a factual basis for that belief. On the
other hand, the implication of the second alternative of the Tamiami test, permitting arbitrary age qualifications if it is impractical to individually determine
an applicant's true qualifications, is that age alone may be an acceptable basis
for making employment decisions. Judicial acceptance of this view has the effect
of reinforcing the stereotypes8 6 which Congress sought to defeat by enactment
of the ADEA.
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.? is an Eighth Circuit decision
more in harmony with the spirit of the Act. In Houghton the question was
whether McDonnell Douglas could transfer a fifty-two year old test pilot to a
non-flight position because of his age. There, as in Greyhound and Tamiami,
the defendant presented evidence showing that reflexes and health decline with
age in the general population.88 The plaintiff responded with specific evidence
that he was in excellent health and virtually certain not to suffer a heart attack
or stroke while in flight,8 9 and with statistical evidence that the accident rate
of professional pilots decreases with age. 90 The court recited the Tamiami
standard, but proceeded with a careful scrutiny of the evidence. The court
concluded that allowing the defendant's overbroad evidence to prevail would
allow the exception to swallow the rule and held that the district court's finding
that age constitutes a BFOQ for this plaintiff was clearly erroneous. 91
Superficially, the results of the cases are bizarre. Age is a BFOQ for buis
drivers, but not for test pilots. The difference lies not so much in the mechanics
of the test employed, but in the care with which the courts weigh the evidence
presented. In the bus driver cases, the courts accepted generalized assumptions
about the decline of ability with age. The Houghton court looked to evidence
that the individual was qualified, ignoring generalizations. Certainly this approach is more in keeping with the purpose of the ADEA.92
Bona FideRetirement, Insurance,Pension, or Seniority Plans
For many years there has been an increasing tendency in the United States

85.
86.
87.

567 F.2d at 1271.
See note 8 supra.
553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).

88. Id. at 563.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 564.
91. Id.

92. See note 7 and accompanying text, supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

for workers to retire before age sixty-five. 93 A parallel trend has been increased
inclusion of compulsory retirement provisions in union contracts and in
corporate personnel practices.9 4 These trends led to the drafting of another
exception to the ADEA's prohibitions. The Act was not violated by an employer acting under a bona fide retirement, insurance, pension, or seniority
plan unless the plan was designed to evade the purposes of the Act.9 5 The Act
provided, however, that no such plan excused discrimination in hiring individuals in the protected age range. 96 Furthermore, the plan may not require the
involuntary retirement of any protected individual. 97
As originally enacted, however, the ADEA did not specifically prohibit the
involuntary retirement of protected employees under a bona fide pension plan.
The circuit courts of appeal differed over whether a plan which existed prior
to enactment of the ADEA could be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
Act. The plan would obviously have been drafted without contemplation of the
Act. 99 In United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann 9 the Supreme Court decided that
93.

The percentages of those eligible to receive social security benefits before age 65 are:

Year

Men

Women

Both Sexes

1965
1970
1973
1974
1975

32
34
41
44
46

47
46
52
54
55

38
39
46
48
50

A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE

OF

SOCIAL SECURITY 74 (1977)

[hereinafter

cited as MUNNELL].

94. Id. at 62-74.
95. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
96. Id. The ADEA provides "that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure
to hire any individual." 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1976). This was intended to allow an employer
to hire an older worker without including this worker in the benefit plan. See note 102 infra.
An older worker would have relatively fewer years to contribute to the plan than other employees, thus, his inclusion would drain resources from the plan fund. An unanswered question
is whether an employer may use such a plan to discriminate among employees. A benefit plan
may be a primary reason for preferring a particular employer. If the employer is free to
withhold the benefits from the older worker, the opportunity to discriminate is presented.
Section 623(a)(1) prohibits discrimination with respect to "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment." 29 U.S.C. §623(a) (1) (Supp. II 1978). Congress, however, appears to permit
such discrimination in employee benefit programs.
97. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
98. The Fifth Circuit, in Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974),
had little difficulty with this problem. "Taft's 'plan' was effectuated far in advance of the
enactment of the law, eliminating any notion that it was adopted as a subterfuge for evasion."
Id. at 215. The court refused to look to the legislative history for guidance on this question,
relying on the 'unambiguous language of the statute," and asserting that if Congress had
meant terms in the statute to have other than their ordinary accepted meanings, it would have
specially defined them. Id. at 216-17.
The Fourth Circuit, in McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 434 U.S. 192 (1977), agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the meaning of the statute was
clear, but disagreed about that meaning. The court held that "what is forbidden [by 29 U.S.C.
§623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978)] is not a subterfuge to evade the Act, but a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the Act." Id. at 220. The relevant purpose was the Act's prohibition of arbitrary
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the ADEA permitted forced retirement of employees within the protected age
range if the plan was adopted before the ADEA became effective.1 00 The Court
stated that the ADEA's legislative history showed Congress was aware of plans
which required early retirement. Therefore, the Court felt Congress intended
that such plans remain in effect.101 Congress soon overruled the Court's reading
of its intent,102 however, by enacting legislation which prohibited plans reage discrimination. Accordingly, a plan drafted prior to the Act could still be a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of the Act, because those purposes speak to concerns older than the Act
itself. The court went on to hold that no plan which arbitrarily forced the retirement of a
protected employee could be in compliance with the ADEA. Id. Any other conclusion would

produce the absurd result that an employer could discharge an employee based solely on age
pursuant to a retirement plan, yet be in violation of the Act if the employee applied for

work the next day, since "no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any
individual .... [29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978)]." Id.
In Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978), the
Third Circuit took a different perspective. The court agreed with McMann decision of the
Fourth Circuit, that a plan may antedate the ADEA, yet still be a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of that act. Id. at 904. This, however, did not close the matter. The court observed
that while the Act forbade discharge on the basis of age, there was no prohibition of early

retirement on pension. Examination of the legislative history demonstrated to the court that
Congress looked with favor on retirement plans, and chose to legislate with respect to discharge only. Id. at 905-06. The court then found that the pension involved was certainly not
so small as to brand the plan a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the act." Id. at 909-10.
99. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). McMann was a technical specialist-aircraft systems when he was
retired over his objections in 1978 shortly after his 60th birthday. 542 F.2d at 218-19. He
joined United Airlines in 1944 and voluntarily joined the retirement income plan in 1964.
The normal retirement age for plan members was 60, and this fact was on the application
when McMann signed. Id. at 219. The plan was initiated by United in 1941. 434 U.S. at 195.
See note 98 .supra.
100. The Court followed the reasoning of Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d
212 (5th Cir. 1974), that a plan in existence before the ADEA could not have been designed
to evade the ADEA's purposes. Id. at 198. The Fourth Circuit's distinction between the Act
and its purposes was dismissed as untenable because the Act was the vehicle by which its
purposes were carried out. If a plan was not a subterfuge to evade the Act, it was also not a
subterfuge to evade the Act's purposes. Id. at 203.
101. Id. at 198. The legislative history to which the court referred was a conversation
between Senators Yarborough and Javits, majority and minority leaders of the bill, respectively. In explaining §623(0(2) Senator Yarborough stated that this section would not disrupt
bargained-for pension plans. Senator Javits concurred. 113 CONG. REC. 31255 (1967).
102. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD
NEws 528, 529: "The conferees agree that the purpose of the amendment to section 4(0(2) is
to make absolutely clear one of the original purposes of this provision, namely, that the exception does not authorize an employer to require or permit involuntary retirement of an
employee within the protected age group on account of age." Id.
In McMann, the Supreme Court held to the contrary, reversing the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal in McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976). The conferees
specifically disagreed with the Supreme Court's holding and Xeasoning in McMann. Plan
provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are not exempt under §4(f)(2) because they
antedate the act or these amendments. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 529 (1978).
As for Congress' positive intent: "During the Senate debate, Senator Yarborough, the floor
manager of the bill, stated that this section ... 'will not deny any individual employment or
prospective employment but will limit his rights to obtain full consideration in the pension,
retirement or insurance plan.' Senator Javits at the time states: 'An employer will not be

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

quiring retirement of employees within the protected age range. 10 3 There were,
however, two minor'0 4 caveats: first, high executives could be automatically
retired at age sixty-five or older if their total pension from the employer was
$27,000 per year or more, 10 5 and second, tenured college professors could be
retired at sixty-five or older.106 This action by Congress clearly precludes the
use of retirement plans to compel early retirement.
Other Defenses
The Act permits discrimination against an employee in the protected age
range if the discrimination is based on reasonable factors other than age. 0 7
Furthermore, it is permissable to discipline any employee for good cause. 108
These two defenses are merely denials of any discrimination., °9 Thus to prevail,
the employee-plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
compelled under this section to afford to older workers exactly the same pension, retirement,
or insurance benefits as he affords to younger workers.' " Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1976) was amended, adding the provision: "[Alnd no such
seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement
of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this Title because of the age of such individual .. " 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
104. Ross, Retirement at Seventy: A New Trauma for Management, FORTUNE, May 8,
1978, at 106, 112 S. REP. No. 493 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONe. &
AD. NEws 504, 527. These exceptions should be of little effect. General Motors estimated that
only 12-15% of its top executives would have pension benefits large enough to qualify. See note
105 infra. Only 0.027% of tenured faculty who are eligible work past the age of 65. See note
106 infra.
105. 29 U.S.C. §631(c)(1) (Supp. II 1978). "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained 65 years of age but not 70
years of age, and who, for the 2 year period immediately before retirement is employed in a
bona fide executive or high policy-making position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirment benefit from a pension, profit-sharing savings or
deferred compensation plan, or any combination of such plans, of the employer of such
employee which equals, in the aggregate, at least $27,000." Id.
106. 29 U.S.C. §631(d) (Supp. II 1978). "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained 65 years of age but not 70
years of age, and who is serving under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement
providing for unlimited tenure) at an institution of higher education (as defined by section
114 1(a) of title 20." Id.
107. 29 U.S.C. §623(0(1) (1976). There is an important question surrounding this exception which the courts have not yet addressed. Because employers frequently give periodic
increases in pay based on length of service, older employees are often paid at higher rates
than younger employees working at the same task. When retrenchment occurs a practical
business decision may be to lay off employees with the highest rates of pay, thus decreasing
unit costs. This will indirectly discriminate against older, higher paid employees. The question
is whether such action is prohibited as discriminatory, or whether it is permissible to discriminate on the basis of pay on the grounds that this is a reasonable factor other than age.
108. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(3) (1976).
109. The defenses of BFOQ and bona fide pension, retirement, insurance or seniority
plan are affirmative defenses. An affirmative defense assumes the complaint to be true, yet
still constitutes a defense to the complaint. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 82 (4th Ed. 1975). The
defenses of "reasonable factors other than age" and "good cause" do not admit the facts of
the complaint.
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ESTABLISHING THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE

Discrimination is often very subtle and difficult to prove.110 Considerable
difficulty, therefore, could be expected in developing rules to determine whether
a particular employment decision was based on age. Suggested tests have been
extensively litigated under the ADEA, but the courts have been aided by their
experience in Title VII discrimination cases.
ProvingDiscriminationUnder Title VI1
In most civil cases the plaintiff must initially present enough evidence to
support a judgment in his favor. If he fails, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict.-' Different rules govern, however, if the plaintiff alleges employment discrimination under Title VII. These rules create presumptions in
favor of the plaintiff which ease the task of proving discrimination. 12 In
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green," 3 a Title VII case alleging racial discrimination, the Supreme Court clarified the rules for assigning the burden of
proof in a racial discrimination case. The Court held that the plaintiff must
initially show only a prima facie case of employment discrimination. This can
be done by showing: (I) that the plaintiff belonged to a racial minority, (2)
that he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants, (3) that despite his qualifications he was rejected, and (4)
that after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer sought
other applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications." 4 After a prima facie case
is established, the burden" 5 shifts to the employer to state a legitimate reason
110. See, e.g., State Div. of Human Rights v. Kilian Mfg. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 201, 318 N.E.2d
770, 360 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 915 (1975). In Kilian the court
pointed out that discrimination today is rarely obvious, and its practices are not so overt that
recognition of the discrimination will be instantaneous and conclusive. Id. at 209-10, 318
N.E.2d at 774, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 609. It is much more likely that one intent on violating laws
against discrimination will be devious, subtle, and elusive.
111. C. McCoiuecK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§337-338 (2d Ed. 1972).
112. See id. §337.
113. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff in Green worked as a mechanic and laboratory
technician for McDonnell Douglas from 1956 until 1964, when he was laid off as part of a
general reduction in force. He was a long-time civil rights activist and protested vigorously
that his lay-off was racially motivated. In protest, he participated in a "stall-in," blocking
traffic coming into McDonnell's main gate at the morning rush hour. He was charged with,
and pleaded guilty to obstructing traffic. Id. at 194. Later a "lock-in" occurred in which
McDonnell's employees were prevented from leaving a building by a chain and padlock on the
door. The plaintiff knew of the plan beforehand, but the extent of his complicity was uncertain. Id. at 195. Following the lock-in, McDonnell advertised for mechanics. The plaintiff
applied for the job, but was turned down because of his participation in the "stall-in" and
"lock-in." The complaint which initiated this case was then filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, charging McDonnell Douglas with racial discrimination. Id. at 796.
114. 411 U.S. at 802. The Court was convinced the plaintiff had proved his prima facie
case. Id. at 803.
115. The Court did not make clear the nature of the burden which shifted. One reading
is that only the burden of going forward with the evidence shifted, and that the defendant
need only produce some evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for his action to rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case. A second interpretation is that the entire burden of persuasion
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for the employee's rejection. 11 If the employer gives a legitimate reason for
rejection, the employee then has an opportunity to prove that the employer's
stated reason was a pretext.

17

ProvingDiscriminationUnder ADEA
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate court to examine
the proof issue under the ADEA. The matter was addressed in Hodgson v. First
FederalSavings & Loan Association."58 This case was decided before Green, but
the pattern for shifting the burden to the defendant was the same. The court
held that the plaintiff was required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The court would then give the defendant a chance to justify his actions. 19 In later cases, the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the Green pattern
of proof for use in ADEA cases; 20 many other courts have followed suit.121
shifts to the defendant. Initially the federal courts took the position that the entire burden
of persuasion shifted to the defendant. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505
F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974). In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 57 (1978), the Supreme
Court indicated only that a burden of going forward with the evidence shifted, not the entire
burden of proof. Id. at 576-78. See generally 9 J. WIGMOS, EVIDENCE §§2485, 2487 (3d ed.
1940); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 58-60, 62-63 (1961).
116. 411 U.S. at 802. The Court did not detail every matter which could constitute a
refusal to hire. However, defendant's assertion that plaintiff's unlawful conduct was the reason
for his rejection was accepted by the court as an adequate response to the prima fade case.
Id. at 803.
117. Id. at 804. This step had not been considered by the district court. See Green v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970), rev'd, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir.
1972), remanded,411 U.S. 792 (1973).
118. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972). The defendant savings and loan association had been
requested to hire the plaintiff as a teller. Plaintiff was a 47 year-old woman who was as
qualified as younger applicants. The interviewer who met with the plaintiff wrote "too old
for teller" on his interview notes. The order which defendant placed with the personnel
firm called for applicants for the teller position between the ages of 21 and 24. Out of thirtyfive hirees for the position none were over 40. In response the savings and loan asserted that
age had not been a factor in its decision, but that plaintiff had been rejected because she was
too heavy to be a teller. Id. at 821-25.
119. Id. at 822. The court reviewed defendant's affirmative defenses and found "that
defendant has not successfully established that Mrs. Hall was not hired as a teller because of
her alleged physical incapacity." Id. at 825 (emphasis added). The requirement that the
defendant establish that its action was non-discriminatory is tantamount to a complete
shifting of the burden of proof, which is appropriate when the defense is affirmative. See note
124 infra. However, the assertion that the defendant's action is based on reasonable factors
other than age is not a true affirmative defense. See note 109 supra. Thus, the court in this
instance placed too heavy a burden upon the defendant.
120. Wilson v. Sealtest Foods, 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974). The plaintiff was 62 at the
time he was required to take early retirement. He was replaced by a 50 year-old employee,
also within the protected age range, though younger. Id. at 86. The fact the replacement
employee is also within the protected age range does not protect the employer's action from
an age discrimination charge. See note 21 supra.
121. See, e.g., Hughes v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 585 F.2d 918, 919 n.1 (8th Cir.
1978); Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, 585 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1978); Rodriquez v. Taylor,
569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). Cf. Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (Green standards may apply to ADEA cases,
but not automatically).
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The Fifth Circuit clarified the scope of the burden which was shifted to the
12
2 After the plaintiff's prima fade showing
defendant in Bittarv. Air Canada.
of age discrimination, the employer produced evidence of unsatisfactory job
performance. The district court held that the plaintiff failed to prove her case
by a preponderance of the evidence. 23 The plaintiff appealed, contending that
after a prima facie showing of discrimination, the employer must prove nondiscrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held that only
the burden of going forward with the evidence was shifted to the defendant
after the prima fade case was established. The burden of proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence remained with the plaintiff.124
The Bittar case presents the traditional rule of evidence. Although the
burden of going forward with the evidence may shift, the burden of proof does
not. 2 5 Many courts in Title VII cases have ignored this maxim, however,
stating that upon a prima fade showing by the plaintiff the burden of proof
s
shifts to the defendant.12
The Supreme Court rejected the shifting burden of proof approach in the
Title VII case of Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney. 27 The
Court held that an employer's burden under Green was satisfied if he simply
explained what he had done or produced evidence of nondiscriminatory
reasons. An employer need not prove absence of a discriminatory motive.228
122. 512 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1975).
123. Id. at 583.
124. Id. at 582-83. This is true, however, only if the employer's defense amounts to no
more than a denial of plaintitFs charge. If the defendant chooses an affirmative defense, such
as a BFOQ, the employer bears the burden of persuasion. Establishment of a BFOQ allows
the employer to apply a general exclusionary rule to otherwise protected individuals based
solely on age. The tendency of the court to place the burden of proof on the party desiring

change and special policy considerations disfavoring statutory exceptions justify the shift of
the burden of persuasion. Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir.
1978) See C. McCoaMicK, EvmEaucE §338 (2d ed. 1972).
125. 9 J. WIGMoRE, EVmENcE §2498 (Sd ed. 1940) "mhe risk of non-persuasion of the
jury never shifts, since no fixed rule of law can be said to shift." Id. What Wigmore refers to
as the risk of non-persuasion is commonly called the burden of proof. See generally James,
Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 58-60, 62-63 (1961).
126. E.g., Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 58 (5th Cir. 1974).
"[Defendant] would have us reverse the burden of proof, placed firmly on the defendant by
plaintiffs' prima fade case ....

We stated earlier that the burden rested on the defendants....

The point we were endeavoring to underscore is that a showing of racially disproportionate
impact puts on the municipal or state defendants not simply a burden of going forward but
a burden of persuasion." Vulcan Soc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 587, 393 (2nd Cir. 1973).
See also Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651, 652, 654 (8th Cir. 1975); Gates v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1974). But see, Long v. Ford Motor Co.,
496 F.2d 500, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1974).
127. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
128. Id. The court relied on its previous opinion in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978) in which it had instructed that "to dispel the adverse inference from a prima

facie showing under McDonnell Douglas [Green], the employer need only 'articulate some
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'" Id. at 578. The Court
of Appeals in Sweeney stated that by requiring the defendant to prove absence of discrimination motive, the Supreme Court placed the burden squarely on the party with the greater
access to such evidence. Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 24-25. The Supreme Court
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Therefore, the burden which shifted to the defendant was the burden of merely
going forward with the evidence.
Sweeney is in accord with the Fifth Circuit's clarification of the Green test
announced in Bittar. Undoubtedly, those courts which follow Green for age
discrimination 129 will incorporate this clarification into the test. The decision

not to place the burden of proof on the defendant comports with traditional
rules of law.130 To place the burden of persuasion on the employer would lead
employers to be more cautious in decisions concerning employees in the protected age range. While this might be advantageous to older workers, it would
violate the ADEA's policy of promoting employment of older persons based on
13 1
ability rather than age.

Statistics
Instead of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination under the
Green test, a plaintiff may meet his prima facie burden through statistical
evidence. 32 Courts have consistently permitted this use of statistical data in
Title VII cases,1 33 and ADEA decisions have followed Title VII practice. T 4 In
Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association.-35 the Fifth Circuit announced that statistics by themselves could support a finding that the defendant
had violated the Act. 36 The evidence presented in First Federalwas that, out
pointed out that the articulation of a legitimate reason was a lighter burden than proving
absence of discriminatory motive, and it was the lighter burden which shifted to the defendant.

Id.
129. See note 121 supra.
130. See note 125 supra.
131. 29 U.S.C. §621(b) (1976). Encouraging employment of older workers on the basis of
their age would be just as contradictory to the Act as taking adverse action based on age.
132. For a general discussion of the use of statistics in discrimination cases see Gilfix,

First Hired-First Fired: Age Discrimination in Employment, 50 CAL. ST. 1.J. 462 (1975);
Montlack, Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce Laws Against Discrimination,22 Cr.av. ST. L.
REv. 25 (1973); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law:
Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REv. 387 (1975); Comment, Statistical Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Litigation: Selection of the Available Population, Problems and

Proposals,29 Sw. L.J. 859 (1975).
133. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). "Statistics are
... competent in proving employment discrimination. We caution only that statistics are not
irrefutable, . . . they may be rebutted." Id. at 339-40. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365
F. Supp. 87, 110 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom., EEOC v. Detroit Edison
Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123

(8th Cir. 1969).
134. See, e.g., Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972);
Polstorff v. Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Ala. 1978). But see Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel
Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (court concluded that statistics cannot be used
exclusively to establish a case of age discrimination).
135.

455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).

136. Id. at 823. Though the court announced that statistics alone might support the age
discrimination case, its reliance was not solely on numbers. The court also looked to evidence
of specific incidents of discriminatory conduct by the employer, such as notes from employment interviews and job orders on file with personnel consultants in which the employer
asked for applicants between the ages of 21 and 24. Id.
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of thirty-five tellers hired during one year, none were in the protected age
37
range.1
Statistical evidence has also been used to make a prima fade case of age
discrimination by showing that the average age of workers in a company decreased following employer action. The cases have left unclear, however, what
degree of disparity between average age before and after employer action will
be sufficient to establish the prima fade case. In Schulz v. Hickock Manufacturing Co., 138 the district court held that showing a decline of thirteen years in
the average age of district managers following a change in top management
demonstrated age discrimination. 139 In a Sixth Circuit case, a decrease in the
average age of salaried employees from forty-three to thirty-seven was held
adequate for jury considertion on the issue of age discrimination.140 In Mastie
v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 41 however, a reduction of 1.29 years in the average
age of employees was found insignificant. 42

137. Id. This fact alone would not support a finding of discrimination. While the applicants for a given job might be dispersed throughout the working age range for an entry
level job, such as teller, the population of applicants might well be skewed towards youth.
Thus, an inference of discrimination based only on the ratio of protected individuals in the
group of new hirees, with no analysis of the age of the pool of applicants does not seem
reasonable. See Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., No. 74-536, Slip op. (D.N.M. Oct. 20, 1977) (employer who concentrates on college recruiting for new technical hirees does not violate ADEA
despite the fact that 90% of new hirees are not in protected age group).
138. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
139. Id. at 1213, 1216. The statistics offered by plaintiff were based on an analysis of
only seven positions. In February 1970, six of the seven positions were held by employees in
the protected age range, and their average age was 53.39. In July, 1971, only three of the
seven were within the protected age range, and the average age had declined to 40.75. New
management had come into the company in February, 1970. Id. at 1213. The small sample
size casts doubt on whether great weight was given to the statistical evidence. With such a
small sample the replacement of even one protected employee by a younger worker could
lead to a significant change in average age. In such a case, the court would probably focus
on the individual incident, rather than the statistical result of the incident. Indeed, in Schulz
the court also relied on testimony that plaintiff's discharge was the result of a "youth movement." Id. at 1212.
140. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 807, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff was appealing the district court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict. The jury had rendered a
verdict for the defendent. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's circumstantial evidence
(statistics) would be sufficient to sustain a directed verdict only if the defendant failed to
"articulate some legitimate and non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. See note 116
and accompanying text, supra.
141. 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
142. Id. at 1320. The court termed the decrease nominal, and went on to say that less
weight should be given to statistics in age discrimination cases, as opposed to race and sex
cases, because of the natural pattern of older workers leaving the job market and younger
workers entering. The court concluded that statistics could never be used exclusively to
establish a prima fade case of age discrimination. Id. at 1320-21. The court's conclusion is
overbroad, and when extended to particular factual settings yields ludicrous results. Given a
hypothetical situation in which a company with a large labor force discharged all its employees
over the age of 50 and replaced them with employees under 25, it is hardly imaginable that
a court would not find a prima facie case on those facts alone. Further, if such action were
unexplained by the defendant, a directed verdict would be appropriate.
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No court had yet relied exclusively on statistics to support a finding of age
discrimination.143 Schulz and Mastie indicate that substantial reduction in the
average age of a work force will be given weight by the court, but minor changes
will be disregarded.
REMEDIES

The provision of adequate remedies under the ADEA is crucial to offset the
expense of proving age discrimination. Remedies available under the Act are
found in subsections (b) and (c) of Section 626. To a great extent, the remedies
available under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193814 (FLSA), are extended
to the ADEA .14 5 The FLSA provides that employers who violate its provisions

shall be liable to the affected employees for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime compensation, and an equal amount as liquidated damages for willful
violations.146 Section 626 provides further, however, that a court may grant
"such legal and equitable relief" as is necessary. 147 This section applies whether
1 49
the action is brought by the Secretary of Labor 1 4 or the affected employee.
The inclusion of the narrowly-defined remedies of the FLSA with the broad
phrase "such legal or equitable relief" has resulted in a split in the federal
courts on the issue of whether punitive and compensatory damages for pain
and suffering are allowable under the ADEA. A majority of the district courts 50
143. See note 134 supra.
144. 29 U.S.C. §§201-219 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
145. The sections of FLSA which are adopted into ADEA are sections 211(b), 216 (except
subsection (a) thereof), and 217.
146. 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (1976).
147. 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1976).
148. 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1976). The ADEA requires that the Secretary initially attempt to
eliminate discriminatory practices through conciliation, conference, and persuasion. If these
methods fail, the Secretary is empowered to bring an action for compliance. Id.
149. 29 U.S.C. §626(c)(1) (Supp. II 1978). If the Secretary does not bring an action, the
right to sue devolves to the discriminatee. Id. The aggrieved individual must notify the
Secretary of Labor of his intent to sue sixty days before bringing an action. 29 U.S.C. §626(d)
(1976 & Supp. II 1978). The notification must be within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
act if not in a "deferral" state or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, or within
30 days after the individual has received notice of termination of state proceedings, whichever
is earlier in a "deferral" state. 29 U.S.C. §626(d)(1) (1976 8 Supp. II 1978). A "deferral" state
is one that has its own statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment. Id. Deferral
of federal actions is governed by 29 U.S.C. §633 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Federal courts
differed over the question of whether the 180-day notice period was of jurisdictional quality
and rigid, or whether it was like statutes of limitation and subject to equitable considerations.
Compare Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976) (180-day notice requirement
subject to equitable modification), aff'd per curiam, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), with, Powell v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1975) (180-day notice requirement is jurisdictional and an absolute bar to suit). Congress amended the ADEA in 1978 to permit
equitable modification of the notice requirement. See 29 U.S.C. §626(d) (Supp. 11 1978). For
a complete discussion of the procedural requirements of the ADEA, see Note, The Procedural
Requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9 Rtr.-CA . L.J. 540
(1978).
150. See, e.g., Ayres v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 78-5946 slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 25, 1980); Newkirk v. General Elec. Co., No. 78-2537 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1979); Douglas
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and all circuit courts of appeal which have addressed the issue 51 have ruled
that neither compensatory nor punitive damages are recoverable. A sizable
minority of district courts, however, have held that one or both are recoverable.152 Only one court has treated the two remedies inconsistently, permitting compensatory damages while disallowing punitive damages.1 53
Such controversy in the courts over the interpretation of a federal statute is
undesirable because the parties will be less likely to settle their differences without litigation. More cases will be tried and the workload of the courts will be
increased. The next section of this note discusses the damages controversy as it
presently exists in the federal courts and suggests a solution.
The Controversy
In Rogers v. Exxon Research & EngineeringCo., 54 Dr. Dilworth T. Rogers,
a research scientist for Exxon, was forced to retire at age sixty. A bifurcated
trial was held, the first part to decide liability, the second to determine damages.
There was no dispute that Exxon had forced the retirement. The liability
question was whether Exxon acted because of Dr. Rogers' age, or, as Exxon
alleged, because of his mental instability. The jury found age to be the reason,
thus Exxon was liable.155
In the damages portion of the trial, the sole issue was the amount of award
for pain and suffering, since plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses were stipulated.56
Dr. Rogers' suffering was allegedly the result of pressure put on him by Exxon
to retire. During this time he experienced severe abdominal pain, vomiting,
impotency, nervousness, and lack of confidence and ambition1 57 He also became afraid to drive because of his feelings of uncertainty258 During his career
Dr. Rogers was a man of notable accomplishment.'59 It was understandable,
therefore, that his reaction to his employer's harrassment would be severe. He
died of a heart attack three and one-half years after his forced retirement,
v. American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn. 1979); Jaffee v. Plough Broadcasting
Co., No. 78-1254 slip op. (D. Md. Mar. 2, 1979.
151. See Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979); Vasquez v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559
F.2d 1036, (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
152. See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas, 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Col. 1980); Hassan
v. Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, Inc., No. 79-206 slip op. (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 1979); Flynn
v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
153. Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (compensatory
damages permitted, punitive damages denied).
154. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D. N.J. 1975), vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
155. 404 F. Supp. at 326.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 330.
158. Id. at 330 n.2.
159. Id. at 329. Dr. Rogers held B.S. and M.S. degrees from Renssalaer Polytechnical
Institute and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard. He was a scientist and inventor of
recognized merit and had developed 50 patents in his 30 years with Exxon. Id.
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while the action against Exxon was proceeding. The jury returned a damage
award of $750,000 for pain and suffering. 160
The judge reduced the award to $200,000,161 but only after carefully reviewing his reasons for granting pain and suffering damages. He felt that the ADEA
1 2
established a new statutory tort. This was supported by Curtis v. Loether, 6
a Fair Housing Act' 63 case in which the Supreme Court characterized a damages
action under the statute as basically a tort action. The statute created a legal
duty and authorized courts to compensate for injuries caused by defendants'
breaches.16 4 The district court in Rogers pointed to a Title VII racial discrimination case in which the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended to make persons whole for unlawful employment discrimination.165
Finding that Title VII and the ADEA were similar both in purpose and
scope, 166 and recognizing that other courts had permitted compensatory damages in racial discrimination cases, 6 7 the court concluded that the award of

160. Id. at 326.
161. Id at 338.
162. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
163. 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3631 (1976).
164. 415 U.S. at 195. The district court in Rogers did not mention that actual damages,
and punitive damages in an amount up to $1000, are specifically provided by the Fair
Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. §3612(c) (Supp. II 1978). The issue in Rogers was not whether a new
legal duty had been created by the ADEA; clearly it had. The issue was whether the statute
permitted compensatory and punitive damages. While the Fair Housing Act is clear on this
matter, the ADEA is ambiguous.
165. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). The district court perhaps
should have noted that there was a significant difference between the statute which the
Supreme Court was addressing and the ADEA. Title VII specifically permits the award of
back pay. The issue was whether back pay should be advanced in the absence of bad faith
by the employer. Moody did not address a problem of statutory construction, while Rogers
did.
166. 404 F. Supp. at 328. The language of the ADEA and Title VII are virtually identical
in their prohibition sections. The difference is that "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin" of Title VII are replaced by "age" in the ADEA. When the legislation which later
became Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was being considered in Congress, it was
suggested that age discrimination be prohibited in that statute. The proposal was rejected
because consideration of the age characteristic might have delayed passage of the statute which
was needed quickly to deal with racial discrimination. Hearings on H.R. 405 Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 22, 38-39, 69, 92, 109, 430, 478-79 (1963). There was, however, included as Section 715
of Title VII, a provision requiring the Secretary of Labor to report to Congress on age discrimination with recommendations for legislation. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-14 (1976). This was the
first congressional step which ultimately led to passage of the ADEA.
167. See, e.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.) (compensatory damages
for humiliation and punitive damages allowed in Fair Housing Act violation), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1021 (1974); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970) ($5000 allowed for
emotional distress in §1983 suit for intentional tort of dismissal from public employment for
exercise of first amendment rights) Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369
F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (award of $1200 for psychic injuries under Title VII), rev'd on
other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974). See Comment, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv.

1109, 1259-1261 (1971).
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compensatory damages should be allowed. 168 The court supported its conclusion

by citing the ADEA's legislative history indicating that Congress intended
mental suffering of the age discriminatee to be compensated. 169
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed on the issue of compensatory damages. Its decision was grounded on the ADEA's silence on such damages, con-

gressional intent, and potential disruption of the administrative conciliation
effort if such awards were permitted in lawsuits. With respect to the ADEA's

silence, the court stated that compensation for psychic or emotional stress was
not universally accepted even in routine tort cases,' 70 and almost never in contract cases.' 7' In the court's opinion, Congress would not have intended
national application of a measure of damages not otherwise uniformly accepted.
Equitable reinstatement sufficed to redress pain and suffering, because the
resumption of productive work removed the source of emotional anxiety and
monetary deprivation which distressed the worker.172 Finally, the court found
that Congress favored enforcement of the ADEA through conciliation and

mediation, with the private lawsuit as a secondary measure. Haggling over the
appropriate sum for compensatory damages would produce a three-sided conffict among the employer, the claimant, and the secretary. If damages for pain
and suffering were allowed in private lawsuits, but not in the administrative
process or in a suit by the secretary, attempts at conciliation would be further
jeopardized. The prospect of receiving a large verdict would make a complainant less likely to settle for out-of-pocket losses in the administrative phase
of the case.173
168. 404 F. Supp. at 331-33.
169. Id. at 330. In his Older American Address to Congress, 1967, President Johnson xemarked that "the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes .. " During the House debate on the ADEA, at least one member pointed out
that the Act was designed to protect older workers from more than the economic effects of
job discrimination: "To deny a person the opportunity to compete for a job because of unfounded age prejudice is a most vicious, cruel, and disastrous form of inhumanity." 113
CONG. REc. at 34745 (remarks of Rep. Eilberg).
170. Rogers v. Exxon Research &Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3rd Cir. 1977). The court
relied on W. PRossaR, LAW OF TORTS §12 (4th Ed. 1971) as authority for this statement. The
court's reading of Prosser's treatise was erroneous, as Prosser only points out that courts have
been reluctant to award damages for psychic injury standing alone. In the presence of
physical injury, however slight, there has been no reluctance to grant awards for mental
anguish. Dr. Rogers' death by heart attack should rank as physical injury. See text accompanying notes 158-165 supra.
171. 550 F.2d'at 840. Here the circuit court relied on 5 A. CoRaNs, CostraAcrs §1076 (1964).
This reference to contract law is puzzling because a contract theory was not mentioned anywhere in the proceeding. The cited section of the contracts treatise is equivocal support for
the court at best, because it acknowledges that in tort cases involving physical injury damages
for psychic injury are permitted. See note 170 supra.
172. 550 F.2d at 840. The court was likely referring to the general case and ignoring the
instant case. Dr. Rogers' death removed the possibility of reinstatement.
173. Id. at 841. The court did not discuss the possibility that in the absence of the threat
of a large verdict employers would have little incentive to settle. If the employer was subject
to a payment of twice the amount of lost wages there would be an incentive for employers to
avoid settlement. Individual claimants would not ordinarily have the funds to wage a battle
in court to collect. Therefore, the employer has much to gain and little to lose by recalcitrance.
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Rogers dealt only with whether damages for pain and suffering were available under the ADEA. The court's interpretation and rationale, however, is
equally applicable to punitive damages. Accordingly, in Dean v. American
Security Insurance Co., 174 the Fifth Circuit extended the Third Circuit's arguments in Rogers to include punitive damages. The district court in Dean permitted a prayer for both compensatory and punitive damages. 175 The decision
was based on the ADEA language incorporating the FLSA remedies and allowing "such legal and equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter."' 76 The district court saw in these words an intent to
increase the scope of remedies under the ADEA beyond that under the FLSA.
Therefore, the court concluded that Congress was concerned with the myriad
ways in which an individual could be harmed by willful discriminatory conduct
77
by the employer.
This reasoning, however, did not impress the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The circuit court found it easier to infer that Congress intended to prevent
psychic injury through compliance, or through reinstatement, promotion, restoration of lost wages, or, where appropriate, through liquidated damages in
the event of non-compliance. The court saw no reason to read into the simple
phrase "legal relief"'i 8 an intent to authorize general damages. 179 Similar arguments were applied against allowing punitive damages. The Fair Housing
Act,180 a congressional effort to eliminate racial discrimination in housing,
expressly authorized the award of punitive damages.' 8 1 Thus, the court concluded that because other protective legislation expressly authorized punitive
damages, the ADEA's silence on the subject impliedly disallowed punitive
8 2
damages.
After Rogers and Dean, two events added further confusion in the federal
courts to the issue of compensatory and punitive damages under the ADEA.
First, the Supreme Court decided the case of Lorillard v. Pons.13 Lorillarddid
See, e.g., Vasquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 111 (Ist Cir. 1978); Flynn v. Morgan
Guar. Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
174. 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
175. Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3, 4 (N.D. Ga. 1976), revid, 559 F.2d
1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). The district court in Dean was following a series of cases in the district which had permitted recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages. E.g., Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga.
1976); Davis v. Adams-Cates Co., No. 76-136 slip op. (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1976); Wilson v.
American Motors Sales Corp., No. 76-125 slip op. (N.D. Ga. April 16, 1976).
176. 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1976).
177. 429 F. Supp. at 4.
178. Early drafts of the ADEA authorized equitable relief, but not legal relief. 113 CONG.
Rac. 2199, 2467, 31248-49 (1967). This change suggests that the phrase was added purposely
and should be given meaning. The Fifth Circuit in Dean found that this addition referred only
to "lost wages" of the FLSA, not to the full range of legal remedies. 559 F.2d at 1038 n.6.
179. 559 F.2d at 1039.
180. 42 U.S.C. §§2601-3631 (1976).
181. 42 U.S.C. §3612(c) (1976). "The court ... may award to the plaintiff actual damages
I..
and not more than $1,000 punitive damages . ."Id.
182. 559 F.2d at 1039.
183. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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not deal directly with the question of damages, but with whether jury trials
were always available in actions under the ADEA. The Court made several
statements, however, which have had an effect on the damages issue. Second,
Congress passed amendments to the ADEA in 1978184 and added statements to
the legislative history of the Act which may bear on its intent with respect to
damages.
Lorillardv. Pons

In Lorillard,the Supreme Court decided that the right to jury trials existed
in ADEA actions. In reaching this decision, it became necessary to define the
term "legal" as used in the phrase "legal and equitable relief" of section 626(b)
of the ADEA. The Court explained that the word "legal" is a term of art. In
cases where legal relief is available and legal rights are determined, the seventh
amendment provides a right of jury trial. 8 5 When words having a well known
meaning at common law are used in a statute they are presumed to have been
used with that meaning'8 6 The Court inferred, therefore, that Congress knew
that the term "legal" implied a right to trial by 7jury and that by using that
term it meant to include that right in the statute1
Further, the Court found that Congress had directed that the ADEA be
enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures of the
FLSA.181 Long before Congress passed the ADEA the right to jury trial was
established among the procedures attendant to the FLSA.89 Congress is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations when it re-enacts a statute without
change. 9 0 Likewise, when Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of
a prior law, prior interpretations of the old law are presumed to apply to the
new law.' 91 Therefore, Congress intended that the procedural rights of the
FLSA, including the right to jury trial, be adopted in actions under the
ADEA.192
The impact of Lorillardon the question of damages under the ADEA is in
184. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256,92 Stat. 189 (1978).
185. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be perserved.I..." Id.
186. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911). See also Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 527, 535-38 (1947). "Words of art

bring their art with them. They bear the meaning of their habitat . . . and if a work is
obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it." Id. at 537.
187. 434 U.S. at 583.

188. 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1976).
189. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1965); Lewis v. Times Publishing
Co., 185 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1950); Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273,
279 (W.D.pa. 1947). See also Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under the Age Discrimination in

Employment and FairLabor Standards Acts, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 365, 376 (1977); Note, Fair
Labor StandardsAct and Trial by Jury, 65 COLum. L. Rxv. 514 (1965).

190. 434 U.S. at 580.
191. Id. at 581.
192. Id.
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dispute. In Kennedy v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.19 3 the

district court used the reasoning and definition of "legal remedy" given in
Lorillard.The award of punitive damages has long been recognized as a legal
remedy. Because Congress was presumptively aware of this when it included the
term in the ADEA, the implication arose that Congress meant for punitive
damages to be available in ADEA actions.194 Other courts, however, have taken
the approach of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute.195 The Slatin court focused on the Supreme Court's statement
in Lorillard that the ADEA incorporated the powers, remedies, and procedures
of the FLSA. Judicial interpretations of the remedies available under the FLSA
had never permitted the recovery of compensatory damages. 196 Therefore, since
Congress presumably knew of these holdings when grafting the FLSA remedies
9
onto the ADEA, it meant for the ADEA to be similarly limited1 7
A majority of courts facing the damages issue since Lorillard have used
reasoning similar to Slatin.19 There appears to be a flaw in this reasoning,
however. While the ADEA, in section 626(b), incorporates the specific remedies
of the FLSA, it goes beyond the FLSA to add "such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter."'a99 It is in this
additional language that remedies beyond the FLSA can be found. The limitations of the FLSA do not apply to this grant of power.2 0 0 Furthermore, even
if section 626(b) were properly limited to FLSA remedies, the issue would not
be settled. Though most courts have assumed that appropriate relief is delineated in subsection (b), that is not the only subsection dealing with damages.
Subsection (c)(1) allows for "such legal and equitable relief as will effectuate
193. 449 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Col. 1978).
194. Id. at 1011. The issue in Kennedy was whether punitive damages were available
under the ADEA. The question of pain and suffering damages was not raised. There should
be no difference under the Kennedy rationale, however, because pain and suffering damages
and punitive damages are both forms of "legal" relief. Only one court which has permitted
the recovery of one of these forms of relief has not permitted the other. In Gifford v. B.D.
Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978), the court allowed pain and suffering damages,
following the Rogers district court opinion, but did not permit punitive damages. The argument was that punitive damages were precluded by the liquidated damages provision for
willful conduct. Id. at 464.
195. 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979).
196. Id. at 1296. The Slatin court did not document its statement that compensatory
damages were not available under the FLSA, although this is the predominant holding. Most
courts which have considered the matter have held that neither a private right of action nor
compensatory damages may be had under the FLSA. See Martinez v. Behring's Serv., Inc., 501
F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974); Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Bonner
v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 177 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1949). However, the conclusion is not universal.
In Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969), the court stated that Congress had
created a "right by legislation" in the FLSA, and that "the federal courts have a duty to
implement the statutory intent by providing the appropriate remedy." Id. at 410.
197. 590 F.2d at 1296.
198. See, e.g., Knerr v. Norge Co., Civ. No. 99-2080 slip op. (S.D. IlI. Sept. 26, 1979);
Douglas v. American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Conn. 1979); Dunwoodie v.
Chrysler Corp., 459 F. Supp. 971, 973 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
199. 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1976). See text accompanying note 144 supra.
200. See Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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the purposes of this chapter" in private suits with no reference to the FLSA
and no other limitations.201 A central rule of statutory construction requires
that, where possible, a statute should not be construed in such a way as to
render any of its parts superfluous or redundant. 202 To avoid redundancy between subsections (b) and (c)(1), it must be concluded that Congress provided
for relief in two separate locations, one with qualifications, the other without.203
1978 Amendments to ADEA
In Lorillard,the Supreme Court granted the right to jury trial on the issue
of lost wages, but did not address the matter of jury trials on the issue of
liquidated damages. In the 1978 amendments to the ADEA204 Congress extended
the right to jury trial to this issue. Explaining Congress' reasons for taking this
action, the joint committee reported that liquidated damages are in the nature
of legal relief, and that in such a case a party should be entitled to a jury trial
of the factual issues underlying the claim. According to the committee, the
ADEA as amended does not provide remedies of a punitive nature. 205 The right
to jury trial on this issue was granted because it was clear that liquidated damages do not penalize under the FLSA but rather compensate for losses too
20 6
difficult to measure by other means.
Several courts have taken the language of the report as a clarification of
congressional intent on the compensatory and punitive damages issue. 207 The
committee's statement was felt to be unequivocal on the issue of punitive
damages, and strongly reinforced the notion that liquidated damages were the
208
sole source of recovery for non-pecuniary loss.
Other courts have found the report not dispositive on the issue of damages,2 05 deeming the best evidence of legislative intent to be the language of the
statute. 210 Given what they consider the unambiguous language and the ADEA's
statement of purpose, plus the fact that the report focused on the ADEA's jury
trial provisions rather than on its remedies, these courts discounted the conference report.21' Furthermore, the intent of the Congress that passed a piece
of legislation should influence the courts, not the opinion of a subsequent
201.

29 U.S.C. §626(c)(1) (Supp. II 1978).

202. See Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors, 517 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1975).
203. See Hassan v. Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, Inc., No. 79-206 slip op. (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 1979).
204. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
205. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
&AD. NE;vs 504, 535.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Plough Broadcasting Co., No. 78-1254 slip op. (D. Md. Mar. 2, 1979);
Brin v. Bigsby & Kruthers, No. 78-2892 slip op. (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 9, 1979); Riddle v. Getty Ref.
&Mktg. Co., 460 F. Supp. 678, 680 (N.D. Okla. 1978).
208. See Brin v. Bigsby &Kruthers, No. 78-2892 slip op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1979).
209. See cases cited in note 211 infra.
210. See Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors, 517 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1975).
211. See Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas, 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Col. 1980); Hassan

v. Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, Inc., No. 79-206 slip op. (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 1979).
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Congress. The language of the remedies sections of the ADEA was not changed
by the 1978 Congress. Therefore, 1978 congressional statements of opinion with
2 12
respect to the intentions of Congress in 1967 should be given little weight.
THE CONTROVERSY AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The arguments on both sides of the issue of compensatory and punitive
damages under the ADEA are strong. Compensatory and punitive damages are
not contemplated by the FLSA. 213 Therefore, those opposed to granting compensatory and punitive damages point to the language of section 626(b) which
states that the ADEA shall be enforced in accordance with the remedies of the
FLSA. Furthermore, Congress placed primary emphasis on administrative
remedies, rather than lawsuits, for enforcement of the ADEA.214 The Act is
silent on whether compensatory and punitive damages may be granted at the
administrative level. It is unlikely that Congress would delegate to an agency
the authority to assess and collect such penalties without setting forth standards
to guide the agency in its determination.2 15 Therefore such damages should not
be available in the administrative phase. With this limitation on the concilia212. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the unchanged language of a statute will
not be given a new interpretation solely because of a clarifying statement by a subsequent
Congress. "Legislative observations .. are in no sense part of the legislative history. . . . It is
the intent of the Congress that enacted [the section] that controls." Oscar Meyer & Co. v.
Evans, 99 S. Ct. 2066, 2072 (1979). In Evans, the Court addressed the question of whether
§633(b) of the ADEA, which deals with deferral to state agencies when the state has a statute
similar to the ADEA, was mandatory or elective. The Court held that resort to state agencies
was mandatory, basing its holding on the similarity of the language in the ADEA and Title
VII, and a well-established holding that such deferral is mandatory under Title VII. Id. at
2071. In so holding the Court specifically rejected a statement from the Committee Report
accompanying the 1978 amendments. The committee stated: "It is the committee's view that
an individual who has been discriminated against because of age is free to proceed either
under state law or under federal law." S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 7, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 510, adopted by Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 12, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 528, 534. The opinion of a later Congress was insufficient to overcome the clear language of the statute. 99 S.Ct. at 2072-73.
213. See note 196 and accompanying text, supra.
214. See Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (1979). The entire thrust
of the ADEA's enforcement provision is that suits by either the Secretary or the private individual are secondary to the administrative process. Private lawsuits may not be commenced
if the Secretary is suing. 29 U.S.C. §626(c)(1) (Supp. II 1978). The Secretary may not sue
until conciliatory efforts are made. 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1976).
215. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). Congress is constitutionally permitted to delegate broad powers to agencies to fix and collect taxes, fines,
penalties, etc., but only if the delegation accompanies an act laying down an "intelligible
principle: to which the agency fixing the amount is to conform. Id. at 409. If Congress has
permitted the Department of Labor to assess compensatory and punitive damages it has
acted unconstitutionally, since no "intelligible principle" for setting the amount of the damages has been articulated. See also National Cable Ass'n. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342
(1974) (Congress does delegate powers to agencies, setting standards to guide their determinations). For analysis of the trend to delegate penalty-setting power to agencies, see Charney,
The Need For Constitutional Protections For Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNEaLL
L. REv.478 (1974). See generally K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW IN THE SEVENTIES 29-39 (1976).
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tion process, it seems unlikely that Congress intended to give complainants the

incentive of additional damages to ignore conciliation and take their case to
court.
On the other hand, Congress did go beyond the FLSA in wording sections
626(b) and (c) of the ADEA to permit such legal relief as would effectuate the
purposes of the chapter. This language encompasses both compensatory and
punitive damages, which fit into the category of legal relief. There is some
evidence that Congress may have anticipated a need for compensatory and
punitive damages, and that it intended by this language to permit such damages.216
No unassailable conclusion can be drawn from the language of the ADEA
or from its legislative history. The hybrid enforcement provisions, drawn partly
from old language from the FLSA, with new phrasing added, are too ambiguous
to support a definite conclusion on congressional intent. The legislative history of the ADEA is devoid of material which deals directly with the question.
There is not a dear statement on the issue of compensatory and punitive damages, although indirect evidence is sometimes offered.217 It is not surprising,
however, that clear congressional intent cannot be found, for there was probably no conscious intent within Congress regarding compensatory and punitive
damages. Foremost in the mind of Congress was the elimination of age discrimination through educating employers and the public. With this primary
goal accomplished, there would be few cases of discrimination. 2 8 The remaining cases would be dealt with by an existing bureaucracy which was experienced in settling similar disputes. Therefore, the number of cases going to
court would be small. Accordingly, the less important question of the scope of
recovery was probably not considered by Congress.
If Congress had actually gone through the reasoning process above, the
ambiguity on this question would not be important. The goals of the ADEA
would be largely attainable, and whether compensatory and punitive damages
were permitted or not would not change this fact. Unfortunately, events have
not transpired as Congress envisioned them. Despite the Department of Labor's
education and promotional programs, age discrimination has not diminished.
In fact, the number of complaints of discrimination has increased dramatically
216. See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 330-31 n.3 (D.N.J.
1975), vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). The court
found that the remarks of Senators Javits and Young during the Senate debate on the ADEA,
and of Representatives Kelly, Pucinski, Eilberg, Pepper, and Dwyer during discussion in the
House, confirmed the view that Congress intended an award of pain and suffering damages.
Representative Dwyer's remarks, emphasizing the frustration, fear, mental anguish, pain,
human suffering and despair experienced by one who loses his job because of his age, were
emphasized by the court. For remarks of senators and representatives see 113 CoNG. REc.
31254-56, 34744-52 (1967). But see Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1338 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (discounting significance of Rep. Dwyer's remarks).
217. Even the statements offered as evidence that Congress intended to permit compensatory and punitive damages do not mention the subject of damages. Instead they focus on the
suffering which results from age discrimination to urge passage of the bill; there is no mention
of any particular remedies. See note 216 supra.
218. See note 8 supra.
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since the early years of the ADEA.219 In addition, the Department of Labor
has been unsuccessful in resolving most of the complaints by conciliation.220
Thus, it appears the congressional plan of eliminating age discrimination
through education, information and conciliation is not working. In such a
situation, it is not surprising to find the courts floundering in their attempts to
determine whether Congress meant to allow compensatory and punitive damages. Congress probably never expected the problem to arise and had no intent
with respect to this question. The courts' difficulties arose because they were
forced to fabricate legislative intent.
CONCLUSION

The solution to the problem, therefore, lies not with the courts, but with
Congress. The ADEA should be amended to dearly express Congress' intent
in light of present circumstances. Given the failure of Congress' earlier conciliatory strategy, the logical action is to permit age discrimination plaintiffs to
recover compensatory and punitive damages in ADEA actions. The threat of a
large recovery would give greater incentive to employers to resolve the discrimination cases in the administrative proceeding. Even more important,
granting these remedies would discourage discrimination at the outset, thereby
furthering a basic purpose of the Act, the prohibition of arbitrary discrimina221
tion in employment based on age.

G. TERRtELL DAVIS
219.

U.S.

DEPARTMENT
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AGE
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OF 1967, 8 (1979). The number of individuals due damages
because of violations of the ADEA in the ten-year period (1969-78) was:
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Fiscal Year

Individuals Due Damages

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

48
131
655
964
1,031
1,648
2,350
1,908
1,943
4,111

Id.
220. In 1976, the success rate for conciliation was only 32%. Of 7877 establishments contacted regarding complaints of violations of the ADEA, only 2490 were successfully resolved by
conciliation. Vasquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 111 (1978).
221. See note 7 supra.
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